Short Swing Speculation by the Sometime 10 Percent Owner: An Analysis of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by Weiner, Michael D.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 4 Article 5
1-1-1976
Short Swing Speculation by the Sometime 10
Percent Owner: An Analysis of Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Michael D. Weiner
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Michael D. Weiner, Comment, Short Swing Speculation by the Sometime 10 Percent Owner: An Analysis of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 16 Santa Clara L. Rev. 859 (1976).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/5
SHORT SWING SPECULATION BY THE SOMETIME 10
PERCENT OWNER: AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 16(b)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934' was enacted as reme-
dial legislation, the result of congressional concern over corpo-
rate fiduciaries engaging in "sure-thing" speculation in the
stocks of their corporations.' Section 2 of the Act reflects this
concern and broadly expresses the Act's purpose: to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in securities transac-
tions.3 Further, this general congressional policy against "in-
sider speculation" was intended to be effectuated principally
through section 16(b),' in which Congress stated its intention
to prevent "the unfair use of information" by "insiders" in
trading of securities.5
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1970).
2. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9
(1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970),
provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security
of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be re-
coverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer, in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be con-
strued to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commis-
sion by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.
Id. The term "beneficial owner" is defined in section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
See note 5 infra.
5. For the purposes of section 16(b) "insiders" are defined in section 16(a) as
follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
859
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To effectively discourage these speculative and manipula-
tive practices, Congress provided in section 16(b)6 an objective
rule-of-thumb prophylaxis. The idea was to take away from the
"insider" any profits realized in a short swing speculation,
thereby deterring such trading. In order to insure effectuation
of the purpose of section 16(b), Congress explicitly made irrele-
vant the intent of the insider who engaged in short term trans-
actions, and further, did not condition the section's application
on proof of actual use of inside information, or of the existence
of a manipulative intent, or of the insider's intent to trade on
a short swing.7 This objective and inflexible appraisal com-
manded by section 16(b) is the result of the underlying congres-
sional fears that unfair use of inside information could effec-
tively be deterred only by a flat rule which plainly made it
unprofitable to trade securities in the short term.'
The purpose of section 16(b), as set forth in the Act itself,
is "to prevent the unfair use of inside information," ' and that
policy is effected by imposition of strict liability on a specified
class of transactions. The specific language defining that class
is found in the exemptive provision'" of section 16(b), which
exempts those transactions involving beneficial owners of more
than 10 percent of a corporation's securities (statutory insiders)
where the beneficial owner did not qualify as such at the time
of both the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the
security involved. This provision has resulted in much contro-
versy, especially over the intended meaning of the phrase "at
the time of,"" and has just recently been interpreted by the
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); see Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S.84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and S.56
and S.97, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6557 (1934) [hereinafter referred to as 1934 Hearings].
8. 1934 Hearings, at 6556-58.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1934). See note 4 supra.
10. The exemptive provision of section 16(b) provides in relevant part:
ITIhis subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . ...
Id.
11. The two opposing constructions of the phrase "at the time of" are "simulta-
neously with" and "prior to," and the choice of either is determinative of the section's
application. For example, suppose X, with no relationship to Corporation A, purchases
15 percent of A's common stock and within six months sells 10 percent of such stock.
[Vol. 16
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United States Supreme Court."2
The basic question with which this comment will deal is
whether the exemption is intended to cover the initial pur-
chase, by a person who is neither a corporate officer nor direc-
tor, which creates 10 percent beneficial ownership. This com-
ment will examine the legislative history surrounding section
16(b), will discuss the conclusions reached by the courts on the
issue, and will comment on the Supreme Court's recent inter-
pretation of the section with regard to a short swing transaction
consisting of a purchase that resulted in more than 10 percent
ownership followed by a sale within six months.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 16(b)
The Necessity for Regulation
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, congressional investigations uncovered convincing evi-
dence that disregard by corporate insiders of their fiduciary
obligations was widespread and pervasive. 3 Unfair use of
inside information or manipulation of corporate activities
resulting in fluctuations in market prices of securities were
frequent practices of corporate officers, directors, and large
stockholders. Among such practices were fictitious or "wash"
sales and "matched" orders, or orders for the purchase and sale
By construing the phrase to mean "prior to," X need not forfeit any profits he realizes
because prior to his purchase he did not own more than 10 percent of A's stock. This
however, is not the result under a "simultaneously with" construction of the phrase,
because simultaneously with his purchase of 15 percent of A's stock, X becomes a
"more than 10 percent owner" and immediately becomes subject to section 16(b).
Compare 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 (2d ed. 1961); and Cook & Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 401 (1953);
and Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1 (1934);
and Note, Section 16(b): Ten Percent Beneficial Ownership Must Exist Prior to Both
Purchase and Sale for Liability to Attach, 53 TEX. L. REV. 857 (1975); and 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 287 (1957), with Lowenfils, Section 16(b)-A New Trend In Regulating Insider
Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1968); and Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities.
Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the
Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1966); and Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b),
62 MICH. L. REV. 649 (1964); and Comment, Short Swing Profits and the Ten Percent
Rule, 9 STAN. L. REV. 582 (1957).
12. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
13. See 10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944), where the SEC stated:
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, profits
from "sure thing" speculation in the stocks of their corporations were
more or less generally accepted by the financial community as part of the
emolument for serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding
the flagrantly inequitable character of such trading.
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of the same security which emanated from a common source
for the purpose of recording operations on the tape and thereby
creating a false appearance of activity. 4 In one particularly
glaring instance, the chairman of the executive committee and
another director participated in a pool organized to trade in the
stock of their company when the stock was paying no divi-
dends. During the operation of the pool, they caused the com-
pany to resume payment of dividends, more than 25 percent of
which were received by pool participants. These dividends were
paid during the pool's operation in spite of the fact that the
company's earnings were not sufficient to meet them and part
of its surplus had to be diverted for that purpose. 5 These types
of practices were summarized in one of the Banking and Cur-
rency Committee reports:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the
hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant be-
trayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the con-
fidential information which came to them in such posi-
tions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied
to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of
inside information by large stockholders who, while not
directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the
destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and
profit by information not available to others.'"
It was these and other similar types of predatory operations by
speculators having access to information not generally avail-
able to the investing public with which Congress was most
concerned. 7
Recognition of these evils and abuses which flourished on
the exchanges finally compelled the conclusion that federal
regulation was necessary. An examination of the legislative his-
tory reveals this "consciousness" by Congress, and its effort to
protect the interests of the public from such evils. In an excerpt
from another Banking and Currency Committee report, it was
stated that
14. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1934).
15. Id. at 9.
16. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
17. Id. at 68. See also Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and
Stockholders: Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 38 MicH. L. REV.
133 (1939); Comment, Section 16(b): Insider Trading, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 872.
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[t]he purpose of the Act is identical with that of
every honest broker, dealer, and corporate executive in the
country, viz., to purge the securities exchanges of those
practices which have prevented them from fulfilling their
primary function of furnishing open markets for securities
where supply and demand may freely meet at prices
uninfluenced by manipulation or control. The Act strikes
deeply not only at the defects in the machinery of the
exchanges but at the causes of disastrous speculation in
the past. It seeks the eradication of the fundamental and
far reaching abuses which contain within themselves the
virus for destroying the securities exchanges.'"
The Development of Section 16(b)
It is evident that such congressional concern prompted the
broad policy to discourage all short swing speculation by insi-
ders which is found in section 16(b) of the Act.'9 Further, Con-
gress adopted in section 16(b) a strict prophylactic rule, since
it believed that the only effective remedy for insider abuses was
to take the profits out of the class of short-term insider transac-
tions in which the possibilities of abuse were believed to be
intolerably great. 0
As noted above, the draconian nature of section 16(b) was
intended by Congress, because, as the legislative history re-
veals, Congress foresaw the difficulty of proving that at the
time he purchased, the insider" intended either to speculate,
manipulate the price, or engage in a short swing transaction.
Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran, one of the principal draftsmen
of the Act, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Bank-
ing and Currency and expressly stated that the short-swing
trading insider was to be subject to the sanctions of section
16(b) "irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the
security within six months," and that as a result the section
was a "crude rule-of-thumb.'" He further emphasized that "you
infer the intent from the fact" of the short-swing transaction
18. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934).
19. See note 4 supra.
20. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557; Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970).
See also Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
21. See note 5 supra.
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and left no room for doubt of the intended objectivity of the
standard.2 It is thus apparent that Congress intended to ob-
viate the problems inherent in proving the trader's intentions
by imposing a conclusive presumption against that class of
transactions. That includes those transactions within less than
six months by officers, directors, and more than 10 percent
beneficial owners which may have been made on inside infor-
mation.23
However, since the presumption was conclusive it was only
meant to apply to those who "may have access" to inside infor-
mation.24 Because of their positions, officers and directors were
clearly insiders with access to inside information. The large
stockholder, however, caused much concern. He may or may
22. Mr. Corcoran. That is to prevent directors receiving the
benefits of short-term speculative swings on the securities of their own
companies, because of inside information. The profit on such transactions
under the bill would go to the corporation. You hold the director, irrespec-
tive of any intention or expectation to sell the security within six months
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of
such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that
the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Senator Gore. You infer the intent from the fact.
Mr. Corcoran. From the fact.
Senator Kean. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he had
to sell?
Senator Barkley. All he would get would be what he put into it. He
would get his original investment.
Mr. Corcoran. He would get his money out, but the profit goes to
the corporation.
Senator Kean. Suppose he had to sell.
Mr. Corcoran. Let him get out what he put in, but give the corpora-
tion the profit.
Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran was one of the principal draftsmen and spokesmen for the
Act. 1934 Hearings, supro note 7, at 6557.
23. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970),
afj'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7thCir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d260 (2d Cir. 1969); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v.Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
24. See, e.g., Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974);Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1969); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
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not in fact have access to inside information. Congress recog-
nized the inherent difficulties in proving whether the large
stockholder actually had access to inside information and
therefore presumed him to be an insider, with access similar to
that of the corporate officer and director."
25. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6556-58. The following brief exchange is
illustrative of the concern for an objective rule applicable to those persons who are so
situated with their corporation that they may obtain inside information.
Senator Kean. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or
officer, but I think to require the ordinary investor-
Mr. Corcoran. A stockholder owning 5 per cent is as much an insi-
der as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or not, he
normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director.
Id. at 6556. Mr. S. Untermyer, an attorney from New York, on whose expertise the
Committee greatly relied, testified to a similar concern:
Mr. Pecora. The theory was that the ownership of 5 per cent of the
stock would practically constitute him an insider, and by virtue of that
position he could acquire confidential information which he could use for
his own enrichment by trading in the open market, against the interests
of the general body of the stockholders. That is, the main purpose sought
to be served.
Mr. Untermyer. I understand the purpose, and I understand the
wisdom of it.
Mr. Pecora. You approve of the principle?
Mr. Untermyer. I approve of the principle, but I do not approve of
its application to anybody who owns 5 per cent, who is not an officer or
director and has no fiduciary relationship.
Mr. Pecora. If you were to raise that limitation to 20 per cent of a
listed or registered security, you probably would have difficulty in having
it apply to any individual, because it is a grave question whether, in any
listed security, there is any individual who owns 20 per cent or more of
the outstanding stock.
Mr. Pecora. We had evidence here last summer from Mr. Van
Sweringen. He and his associates felt that if they could acquire a block
of stock which amounted to around 10 or 15 per cent of an important
railroad line, they would thereby get management control. He admitted
that very blandly.
Mr. Untermyer. So, you will not let anybody acquire over 5 per
cent.
Mr. Pecora. It is open to anybody to do it, but he can not use the
information to trade for his own account against the public interest.
Mr. Untermyer. But he can not get any profit out of it. He is fore-
closed from making anything out of it, and the result is that he will not
buy it.
Mr. Pecora. He can profit from it provided his transactions are
more than six months apart. It is designed avowedly to prevent insiders
from utilizing their position to trade for their own account and against
the interests of the general body of the stockholders. The only penalty
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Thus Congress has in effect created two presumptions in
the section. The first establishes that a beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of the outstanding equity securities of the
corporation is an insider. That is, it is presumed he has access
to inside information the same as the director or officer. The
second conclusively presumes that any transaction within any
period of less than six months which results in profits is made
on the basis of inside information. The presumption does not
apply where the trader was not the beneficial owner of more
than 10 percent "at the time of" both the purchase and the
sale. The intentions of the "insider" trader are irrelevant and
any profits realized must be forfeited to the corporation.2"
Thus it is clear that the congressional intent dominating
the section is one of complete prophylaxis." The intent was to
deter speculation by a class-officers, directors, and principal
stockholders-because their speculative transactions may have
been made on advance inside information.2" To emphasize its
intent to insure and maintain a fair market in the interests of
the public,2" Congress expressly declared in the preamble to
section 16(b) that the section was specifically "for the purpose
of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
against it, as you have observed, is that he has to disgorge his profits for
the benefit of all the stockholders.
Mr. Untermyer. But he may just buy for the purpose of protecting
the stock, and he may want to sell it as soon as he can. He may not be
an insider at all. There are many corporations owned or controlled by big
banking houses that have not one per cent of the stock. They know more
about it. They have got more information than the fellow who owns thirty
per cent of the stock. They know all about it because they are running
it. To take one extreme case, like the Wiggin case, and predicate legisla-
tion of this kind upon it is very dangerous because, as you know, Mr.
Pecora, hard cases make bad laws.
Mr. Pecora. We do not know how many other cases of Wiggins there
might be.
Mr. Untermyer. There are plenty.
Id. at 7741-43; see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
26. 19.34 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557. See generally Reliance Elec. Co. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422-25 (1975).
27. 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) and cited authority therein.
28. See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MIcH. L. REV. 649 (1964);
Comment, Short Swing Purchases and Sales Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61
Nw. L. REV. 448 (1966); Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 YALE L. J. 510 (1949-50); Note, Section
16(b)-Ten Percent Beneficial Ownership Must Exist Prior to Both the Purchase and
Sale for Liability to Attach, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 857 (1975); 57 COLUM. L. REV. 287 (1957).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
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been obtained by [an insider] . "..."30 Further, the section
was designedly remedial and it therefore must have been in-
tended to be construed as broadly as possible.3 This is appar-
ent by its own terms, which subsume all transactions of all
insiders irrespective of the surrounding facts and circumstan-
ces.2 If any other interpretation is given the section-that is,
a restrictive or an inappropriately literal one-then its practi-
cal effect would be at odds with its intended purpose.
3
THE EXEMPTIVE PROVISION
An Element of Ambiguity
The underlying congressional purpose should provide a
key for interpreting a statute, in combination with the general
background and law which prompted the enactment of the
legislation. This must be considered when construing section
16(b), and especially so when construing the exemptive provi-
sion at the end of the subsection. The exemptive clause
provides:
This subsection [16(b)] shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved . . . .
30. Id. at § 78p(b).
31. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1970); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1970); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Truncale
v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (dictum). See generally Cook & Feld-
man, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385 
(1953).
32. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557; Kern County Land Co. 
v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1972)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Feder v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
33. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 
918, 923-24 (8th
Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors
Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff 'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), 
cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
34. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange 
Act,
66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 612 (1953); Note, Insider Liability for Short Swing Profits: the
Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach Once Insider Status is
Determined, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 592 (1974); Comment, Short Swing Purchases and Sales
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Nw. L. REV. 448 (1966); 70 HARV. L. REV. 1312
(1957).
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis
added).
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The term beneficial owner is defined in section 16(a) as
"[elvery person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity
security . . . ."I On first impression, the exemptive provision
appears to be simple and straightforward; however, it contains
an element of ambiguity." It is clear that the term "transac-
tion" means a purchase/sale sequence or a sale/purchase sequ-
ence.3" Logically, then, the next questions are what is a pur-
chase and what is a sale. Congress chose to define those termsin sections 3(13) and 3(14) of the Act respectively,39 and did sobroadly. Although the terms are not entirely precise, the courtshave consistently construed them broadly in their application
to section 16(b).10 The ambiguity of the exemption is in the
meaning of the phrase "at the time of" the purchase and sale
or the sale and purchase.
To illustrate the equivocal nature of the phrase "at the
time of," consider the purchase by which one initially becomes
a more than 10 percent beneficial owner. Suppose further that
this purchase is followed by a sale within six months. Is this
transaction within the meaning of the exemption or is it ac-
countable under section 16(b) for any realized profits? Clearly,
the interpretation of the phrase "at the time of" is critical and
determinative of the issue.
If one were to interpret the phrase "at the time of" to mean
"prior to," then this transaction would be exempt,4 because
the purchaser would not be a more than 10 percent beneficial
owner of securities prior to the purchase of the transaction inquestion. This construction appears to be the literal translation
of the phrase, but as discussed below, not its intended mean-
ing. On the other hand, if one were to construe the phrase to
36. Id. § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).
37. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)(Kaufman, J.), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).38. Cf. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 570(N.D. Ill. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 865 (1976).
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1970). The terms "buy"
and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire, and
the terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 & nn.12-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
41. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 494 F.2d 918 (8th Cir.1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige MotorsCorp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Kaufman, J.), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
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mean "simultaneously with," then this transaction would not
be exempt from section 16(b) liability. Further, any profits
realized on the transaction would have to be forfeited to the
issuer as required by the rule.
No doubt the reader has spotted the single flaw in the
latter interpretation. By interpreting the phrase "at the time
of" to mean "simultaneously with," or "immediately after" in
the case of a sale, the section can easily be circumvented by
selling enough securities so that after the sale there is less than
10 percent beneficial ownership. Since this would clearly frus-
trate the deterrent purpose of the section, a "logical" inconsis-
tency must be accepted: the phrase "at the time of" must be
interpreted to mean "simultaneously with" in the context of a
purchase, and "prior to" in the context of a sale. 2 Further, this
construction is most harmonious with the remedial purpose of
the section.
The problem of determining the correct interpretation of
the section is compounded by the fact that the legislative his-
tory surrounding the exemptive provision is scanty at best.
However, examination of whatever legislative history there is,"
in addition to the broad congressional policy underlying the
Act" and almost 40 years of case authority, compels the "si-
multaneously with" interpretation requiring accountability
under section 16(b).11 Congress clearly intended a broad tho-
42. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 919, 923 (8th Cir.
1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors
Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (dictum), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); 2 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REOULATION 1060 passim (2d
ed. 1961); Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1,
19-20 (1934); 57 COLUM. L. REV. 287 (1957). Contra, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provi-
dent Sec. Co., 506 F.2d 601, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 865 (1976); Arkansas Louisiana Gas v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co.,
141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
43. See notes 7, 8, 13, 14-18 & 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
44. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1934).
45. See Perine v. William Norton & Co. Inc., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974);
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965);
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965); Gratz
v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Park & Tilford
v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). But see Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R.
Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
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roughgoing rule to prevent the unfair use of inside informa-
tion;4" moreover, it is necessary in the determination of a stat-
ute's meaning to recognize that the purpose of Congress is the
dominant factor, and where a choice may be made between two
possible constructions, that construction should be chosen
which would serve to effectuate the congressional purpose
rather than defeat it.47
In light of this, it is logically necessary to perceive that a
statute's intended purpose is not to be subverted by a narrow
and literal reading of it. To be sure, one may not read into the
statute language that is not there; but one must also not blind
oneself to the underlying congressional effort. When the under-
lying policy is so clearly articulated by Congress, the literal
words of the section, if in fact they produce an unreasonable
result "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as
a whole," must yield to the essential policy of the Act 4 unless
the section itself commands otherwise. Thus, since the intent
was to deter the possible use of advance inside information,"
the section must be construed to include the purchase with
which insider status is obtained, and the following sale within
any period of less than six months.
46. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949); Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
47. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 112 & n.5 (1948).
48. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1943),
where Judge Learned Hand remarked:
There is no surer guide in the interpretation of a statute than itspurpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of over
solicitude for the latter than to wince at carrying out that purpose be-
cause the words used do not formally quite match with it.Id. at 830. See also Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and
authority cited therein.
49. See Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 885 & n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Such
a policy was also stated in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943),
where the Court declared:
However well [rules of statutory interpretation] may serve at times to
aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated
to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity
with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context
and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly
permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed
legislative policy.
Id. at 350-51, quoted in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959(S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
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The Potential for Abuse by the Sometime 10 Percent Owner
As previously noted, the section was designed to prevent
the unfair use of information "obtained by such beneficial
owner" by reason of his relationship to the issuer. The impor-
tant factor is the potential for obtaining inside information, not
the ripening of equity ownership. It is clear that Congress did
not intend to subject the mere stockholder to section 16(b)
liability; however, it is also clear that its principal intent was
to protect the public's interests by discouraging the misuse of
inside information. 0 It was the "vicious" practices uncovered
at the Senate Committee hearings-the market manipulations
by the "insiders," and the frequent unfair use of advance inside
information-which prompted Congress to act and which pro-
vided the background to section 16(b).11 A "prior to" interpre-
tation of the phrase "at the time of" would frustrate the con-
gressional purpose, whereas a "simultaneously with" interpre-
tation would carry it out by focusing not on the "ripening of
equity ownership" but on the time period when the potential
for obtaining inside information exists.5" Mr. Pecora, one of the
principal draftsmen of the Act, testified to this effect when he
expressed concern over the fact that once insider status was
acquired, the potential to manipulate corporate affairs and
advantageously speculate would exist. The focal point of his
testimony was not the acquisition of the securities, but the
abusive possibilities thereafter.53 Mr. Pecora's testimony
50. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, 6556-58, 7741-43.
51. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
52. See, e.g., Note, Section 16(b): Ten Percent Beneficial Ownership Must Exist
Prior to Both the Purchase and Sale for Liability to Attach, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 857
(1975).
53. Mr. Pecora. We had evidence here last summer from Mr. Van
Sweringen. He and his associates felt that if they could acquire a block
of stock which amounted to around 10 or 15 percent . . . , they would
thereby get management control. He admitted that very blandly.
Mr. Pecora. The only point I want to make is that with that evi-
dence in mind, that management control of an active stock could be
obtained through control of 10 per cent of the outstanding stock-and
there was a large amount of stock outstanding-where an individual
owned as much as 5 per cent or more, he would be in a position, through
that ownership of a block of stock of that size, to virtually be an insider,
and he could very well dictate, with one or two others, elections to the
board of directors.
1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 7742.
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clearly suggests that information "obtained by reason of [a]
relationship to the issuer" can be information obtained prior to
and in connection with becoming a more than 10 percent bene-ficial owner. In addition, SEC staff opinions have taken theposition that a change in beneficial ownership is made when a
shareholder makes a firm commitment to take or divest himself
of the beneficial ownership of the securities." The SEC position
suggests recognition that a trader is a more than 10 percent
beneficial owner "simultaneously with" the transaction that
makes him one.5"
Moreover, by literally translating the phrase to mean
"prior to," emphasis is placed on the time period which is mostinapposite to section 16(b), rather than that period when the
potential for misuse of inside information is greatest. A person
who purchases 10 percent may or may not have done so on
advance inside information; he is not presumed to do so under
a "simultaneously with" interpretation. His access to insideinformation and possible misuse of it is, however, recognized
under this interpretation." Once an insider, the possibility thathis short term sale was made on inside information is great andit is this potential evil which the section aims to discourage. A
"prior to" interpretation will not, simply because it fails to
recognize the "initial" short swing transaction, that is, the po-
tential for abuse during the period from acquisition of benefi-
cial ownership through divestiture."7 The abuses which may
See also the proposed ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413(d) (Tentative DraftNos. 1-3, 1974) which attempts to codify a similar analysis. See note 57 infra for text
of § 1413(d).
54. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 116, 11 Fed. Reg. 10968(1946).
55. E.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
56. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 923-24 (8th Cir.1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige MotorsCorp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act,
21 VA. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1934).
57. See the proposed ALI FEDERAL SECURITIEs CODE § 1413 (Tentative Draft Nos.1-3, 1974), which attempts to clarify and combine the Securities Act of 1933, theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, and various other statutes. It provides for a construc-tion of the present exemptive provision in section 16(b) analogous to the "simultaneous
with" construction urged by this Comment; its purpose, as expressed by the Reporterfor the ALI Code, is to recognize and preserve the symbolic significance of section 16(b)
as distinct from Rule lOb-5 and other similar provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Actsprohibiting abuse of inside information. Reporter's Comments (1) and (2) to the ALI
[Vol. 16
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occur under a "prior to" construction are striking indeed, as
illustrated by the following examples-and it should be
pointed out that under a "simultaneously with" interpretation,
each of these transactions would be subject to the sanction of
section 16(b).
First, a person who becomes a 10 percent beneficial owner
as a result of a purchase of a large block of stock may have
obtained advance inside information prior to the purchase
through negotiations for the purchase with the corporation or
a substantial stockholder. Such person could purchase the
stock on the basis of the advance information so obtained, and
then sell the stock for a short swing profit. Second, a person
may purchase a large block of stock (more than 10 percent) in
a corporation in anticipation of engaging in manipulative prac-
tices which would raise the market price of the stock and ena-
ble him to sell his stock at a profit. Third, although a person
may purchase stock "simultaneously with" or "prior to" be-
coming an insider without any advance inside information or
intent to manipulate the corporation's affairs, he could never-
theless obtain information after having become an insider
which could be capitalized upon in effecting a sale of the
stock. "
These practices are clearly similar to those "vicious" prac-
tices unearthed during the congressional investigations preced-
ing the passage of the Act. To assume that they were not con-
templated by Congress seems wholly unrealistic and would
make section 16(b) largely ineffectual, since its express purpose
was to "prevent the unfair use of information."
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973). Section 1413 provides
in relevant part:
(a) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information that
may have been obtained by a person within section 604(a) by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from a purchase
and sale (or sale and purchase), within a period of less than six months,
of securities of a class subject to that section inures to and is recoverable
by the issuer irrespective of any intention on his part, in entering into the
transaction, to hold the security purchased or not to repurchase the secu-
rity sold for at least six months.
(d) This section applies with respect to (1) a purchase that makes
a person a more than 10 percent owner within section 604(a), and (2) a
sale within less than six months after the purchase that created that
status, whether or not the seller has that status at the time of the sale.
ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413(a), (d) (Tentative Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
58. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 22-25, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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The Construction Must Be Gleaned from the Statute as a
Whole
Another factor which suggests that the proper construction
of the section should include the initial transaction was briefly
noted earlier. It is the premise that the interpretation of a
subsection should be consistent with the purpose of the whole
section, the purpose of the statute, and the congressional pur-
pose underlying the enactment of the statute." Thus, the provi-
sion in section 16(b) cannot be construed in such a manner that
either it or other subsections-specifically 16(a), 16(c), 16(d),
and 16(e) 6°-become mere surplusage or inconsistent with one
another.
To illustrate this, consider that section 16(d), in part, ex-
empts from section 16(b) certain transactions by a securities
dealer in the ordinary course of his business and incident to the
establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or second-
ary market." Consider also, that section 16(e) provides an ex-
emption for certain foreign or domestic arbitrage transac-
tions. " If one were to construe the provision in section 16(b) to
mean "prior to," then sections 16(d) and 16(e) would be largely
superfluous because they would for the most part be exempting
transactions that the provision in section 16(b) would already
have exempted from section 16(b) liability.
Since the typical arbitrage transaction involves only a sin-
gle purchase and sale,63 there generally is no pre-exisitng own-
59. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
60. It should be noted that subsection (d) was redesignated as (e) and a new
subsection (d) was added by amendment in 1964. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 8, 78 Stat. 565, amending 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1952)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964)).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(d)(1970), provides
in relevant part:
The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to any
purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions of subsection(c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, of an equity security not
then or theretofore held by him in an investment account, by a dealer in
the ordinary course of his business and incident to the establishment or
maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market . . . for such
security.
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(e) (1970), provides
in relevant part:
The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or domestic
arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to carry out the pur-
poses of this section.
63. The typical arbitrage transaction is a purchase in one market and sale in
(Vol. 16
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ership that would subject a trader to the risk of 16(b) liability
on sale. It is true, as the Court noted in Foremost-McKesson,
Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.," that there is nothing on the
face of sections 16(d) and 16(e) that would make them applica-
ble to one selling securities the purchase of which made him a
"beneficial owner"; thus, liability is possible only if 16(b) itself
makes the initial purchase a qualifying event. Under a "simul-
taneously with" interpretation that is exactly what would hap-
pen, and the exemptions would be necessary; otherwise they
are largely redundant.
A further factor which suggests that a "simultaneously
with" construction was intended by Congress, so that the ini-
tial purchase by which one becomes a more than 10 percent
owner qualifies under section 16(b), is apparent from the need
for Rule 16b-2,65 which was promulgated by the SEC"
6 within
another for the sake of the profit arising from the difference in price between the two
markets. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
64. 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
65. SEC Rule 16b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1975) provides:
(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions of
section 16(b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-2, as not
comprehended within the purpose of said section upon the following con-
ditions:
(1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business
of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in the ordi-
nary course of such business, in the distribution of such block of securi-
ties;
(2) The security involved in the transaction is (A) a part of such
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the transaction,
with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or other person
on whose behalf such securities are being distributed or from a person
who is participating in good faith in the distribution of such block of
securities, or (B) a security purchased in good faith by or for the account
of the person effecting the transaction for the purpose of stabilizing the
market price of securities of the class being distributed or to cover an
over-allotment or other short position created in connection with such
distribution; and
(3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16(b) of the Act
are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms
at least as favorable as those on which such person is participating and
to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons
exempted from the provisions of section 16(b) of the Act by this §
240.16b-2.
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), provides
the authority by which the SEC was able to promulgate Rule 16b-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.16b-2 (1975), which reads in relevant part as follows:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction . . .
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eight months after the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The purpose of the Rule was declared to be to
exempt those transactions in "connection with the distribution
of a substantial block of securities." 7 The need for such a rule
was perhaps best expressed by Mr. E. Seligman in late 1934,just prior to the promulgation by the SEC of Rule 16b-2. Mr.
Seligman inferred that the intended meaning of the words "at
the time of" was "simultaneously with" and that
[u]nder this construction if a banker buys from a corpora-
tion more than 10% of a class of a registered equity security
and offers the same for resale to the public, he must ac-
count for any profit to the corporation. [T]his result is
obviously a most serious one, especially at the presentjuncture of economic conditions in this country. . . . [It]
is believed nevertheless that the risk of [this] construc-
tion is so great that no conservative banker should take a
chance in the matter. Consequently there is a pressing
need for regulations by the Commission exempting financ-
ing both in the case of 10% owners and directors. The spirit
of the Act certainly would not be violated by such an ex-
emption."
The obvious import of Mr. Seligman's statement was that sec-
tion 16(b) was discouraging stock financing through registered
securities, a necessary tool in corporate finance; unless the
underwriter, the essential link in corporate financing, had an
exemption, he would, under section 16(b), forfeit any profits
he might realize on his efforts. The SEC, recognizing the plight
of the underwriter and the necessity of his operations to the
financial community, provided the appropriate and needed
exemption.
It seems clear that what prompted Congress to add the
exemptive provision was its concern regarding the situation
where 10 percent benficial ownership was acquired under cir-
cumstances indicating no possibility for speculative abuse.
Such situations arise within the context of section 16(b) where
"more than 10 percent beneficial ownership" is acquired or lost
by way of an estate, gift or otherwise than by purchase or sale.
which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not com-
prehended within the purpose of this subsection.
67. SEC Rule 16b-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2(a) (1975).68. Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1934).
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Consequently, the provision provides an exemption for "any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at
the time of the purchase and sale . . .,,'
It was Congress' intent to prevent transactions (purchases
and sales) which might be made on the basis of inside informa-
tion. Where there was no possibility of access to information on
the purchases or on the sales, then those transactions were not
intended to be subject to section 16(b).7 ° Thus, where a pur-
chase resulted in less than 10 percent beneficial ownership,
there could be no section 16(b) presumption that there was
access to inside information. It appears from testimony that
section 16(b) was not intended to apply to the situations where
10 percent beneficial ownership was acquired or lost because of
the purchase by the corporation of some of its outstanding
securities, by partial redemption of stock by the corporation,
by devise or gift of the corporation's stock, or acquisition of the
stock incident to service as an executor or trustee in a similar
fiduciary capacity.7 Review of some testimony on the original
bill 2 before the Senate subcommittee implies just such an in-
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
70. See note 73 infra.
71. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 30, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
The proposed ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413(f) (Tentative Draft Nos. 1-3,
1974) attempts to codify the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The Code similarly attempts to exempt certain situations from the sanctions
imposed on insider short swing speculations. Section 1413 provides in relevant 
part:
(f) (1) Sections 293(f)(4) and 293(g)(1), (4), and (6) do not apply for
purposes of this section.
Section 293 provides in relevant part:
(a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract to sell, contract of sale
of, or disposition of a security or interest in a security for value.
(f) Except as provided in section 293(g), the terms in this section
include . . . (4) the payment of a dividend in a security of another com-
pany.
(g) Notwithstanding section 293(f), the terms defined in this sec-
tion do not include a bona fide (1) gift, (2) transfer by death, (3) transfer
by termination of a trust, (4) pledge or security loan, (5) split or reverse
split, or (6) security dividend ....
See note 57 supra for text of ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413 (Tentative Draft
Nos. 1-3, 1974).
72. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934).
73. Senator Carey. Suppose this stock passed to an estate, and the estate
had to raise money?
Mr. Corcoran. I do not think, in that case, sir, the statute would
apply.
Senator Kean. Why not?
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tent, as illustrated in a brief exchange concerning a situation
where stock passed to an estate, which thereby became a "more
than 10 percent beneficial owner," and which was within six
months forced to sell. Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran unequivocally
stated that it was not the intention to include such situations
within section 16(b)'s prohibitions."
Deference to the Courts
Another factor which should be considered in assigning a
meaning to the exemptive provision of section 16(b) is its con-
struction by the courts.74 It should be noted that the most fre-
quent forum for securities law cases has been the Second Cir-
cuit, which has consistently interpreted section 16(b) in the
broadest possible terms in order not to defeat its avowed objec-
tive, resolving all doubts and ambiguities against the trader.75
It should also be noted that the Second Circuit has provided
much of the construction and application of the Securities Ex-
change Act-in particular section 16(b)-and its interpreta-
tions generally have been deferred to and supported as cor-
rect." Additionally, the congressional policy has been one of
deference to the Second Circuit, especially regarding its inter-
pretation of section 16(b). This is apparent from Congress' im-
plicit approval of the way the courts have construed and ap-
Senator Carey. The estate is the beneficiary.
Mr. Corcoran. I do not believe it would. Certainly the intention was
that it should not apply to that sort of a situation.
1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6558.
74. See cases cited in notes 23, 24, 45 supra.
75. See Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974); Newmark
v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Feder
v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1969);
Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), af/'d, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Park
& Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Kaufman, J.), a/I'd,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.
Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (dictum).
76. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970),
aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir.
1965); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965).
But see Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
a/I'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc., 372
F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Il. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 865 (1976). Contra, Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
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plied the section. Although congressional non-action is far from
conclusive, tacit acquiescence must be afforded recognition,
especially in view of the consistently broad manner in which
the courts have construed the section since its enactment.
THE CASE HISTORY OF SECTION 16(b)
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors-An Objective Appraisal
The first case in which a court considered the question of
whether section 16(b) was applicable to a transaction consist-
ing of a purchase by which 10 percent beneficial ownership was
acquired, followed by a sale within less than six months, was
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp." The court was faced
with the "novel" problem of interpreting the exemptive provi-
sion in section 16(b). Judge Kaufman, speaking for the court,
concluded that the phrase "at the time of" contained an ele-
ment of "ambiguity" and in light of the purpose of the section
must be construed to mean "simultaneously with" rather than
"prior to." His rationale was that if the phrase was interpreted
to mean "prior to," it would be possible for a person to pur-
chase a large block of stock, sell it out until his ownership was
reduced to less than 10 percent, and then repeat the process ad
infinitum because prior to each re-purchase, the person would
not be a "more than 10 percent beneficial owner.""8 He rea-
soned that the deterrent value of section 16(b) would be under-
cut because each purchase and sale could easily have been
made on the basis of advance inside information. He thus con-
cluded that the underlying congressional purpose of the section
could be effectuated if and only if the purchase by which one
became a "more than 10 percent beneficial owner" was in-
cluded as part of the transaction for the calculation of profits
which had to be forfeited under the section's mandate. Such a
construction, he said, would be consistent with the express
remedial purpose of the statute to prevent the possible unfair
use of inside information by stockholders owning more than 10
77. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Plaintiff Stella was a stockholder of
Kaiser-Fraizer Corp. and sued Graham-Paige Motors Corp. to recover profits realized
on a short swing transaction. Graham-Paige purchased 750,000 shares of Kaiser-
Frazier stock and, by said purchase, Graham-Paige became the beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of Kaiser-Frazier common stock; within less than six months
from the date of purchase, Graham-Paige sold some of the stock it purchased and
realized a profit therefrom. Id. at 957-58.
78. Id. at 959.
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percent of the equity stock.79
On appeal,"' the court adopted Judge Kaufman's interpre-
tation of section 16(b) and without further analysis affirmed
over a lone dissent by Judge Hinks, who based his dissent solely
on a literal reading of the exemptive provision. The United
States Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari without
comment."
In light of the paucity of cases on this particular issue, and
Judge Kaufman's analysis of the congressional purpose and
intent of the section, the construction of the provision adopted
in Stella became authoritative and was adopted by virtually
every other court that has considered the question."2
Further, the Stella court established the basis for the
"objective" approach to section 16(b): it considered the stat-
ute's remedial purpose and then construed it to maximize its
deterrent effect. This became the recognized policy of the
courts, particularly of the Second Circuit, toward section
16(b); its literal meaning became subordinate to the "purpose
of preventing the unfair use of inside information."" Indeed, as
one court remarked, "The judicial tendency . . . has been to
interpret section 16(b) in ways that are most consistent with
the legislative purpose, even departing where necessary from
the literal statutory language.""'
In light of this type of approach, "insiders" came to recog-
nize that the courts would apply the section in the manner
most consistent with its broad underlying purpose and that all
doubts and ambiguities would be resolved against them. 5
Thus, under the "objective" approach, where any profits were
79. Id. at 959-60.
80. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
81. 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
82. See, e.g., Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974);
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); and cases cited in notes 75 & 76 supra. But see
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark.
1956).
83. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)(dictum). See also cases cited in notes 75 & 76 supra.
84. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1969).
85. See note 31 supra.
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realized from a short swing transaction, the statute was con-
strued liberally, irrespective of the "facts and circumstances"
of the transaction, to effect its deterrent purpose. 8 Mr. Justice
Stewart, then on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, perhaps
best expressed this approach when he stated, "Every transac-
tion which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so
defined if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend
itself to the speculation encompassed by section 16(b) .) 87 As
another court remarked, such an approach requires that the
court's initial consideration be the salutary purpose of the sec-
tion and the practices it was designed to prevent.8
In making this determination under the "objective" ap-
proach, the courts look to that point at which the insider has
the ability to control the transaction and the potential to use
inside information to his own advantage and to the detriment
of the outside stockholder. 9 Since the potential for unfair use
of inside information exists concurrently with insider status, a
"simultaneously with" construction is compelled." Such an
approach is consistent with the congressional policy to protect
the interests of the public, and also implements the section
best by preventing those potentially abusive short swing trans-
actions in which "more than 10 percent beneficial ownership"
is obtained on purchase.'
86. See note 46 supra.
87. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
88. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965) (whether an insider's conversion of one class of common stock into another
constituted a section 16(b) purchase).
89. But cf. Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961 (1965). See generally notes 48-58 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6556-58, 7742; Emerson Elec. Co. v.
Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418
(1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See generally 2 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 passim (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1953); Seligman, Problems
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1934); Note, Section 16(b):
Ten Percent Beneficial Ownership Must Exist Prior to Both the Purchase and Sale for
Liability to Attach, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 857 (1975).
91. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949). See generally S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68
(1934); note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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Reliance Electric v. Emerson Electric-A New Objective
Approach
The question of section 16(b)'s applicability to a pur-
chase/sale short swing transaction in which the purchaser be-
came a more than 10 percent beneficial owner on his initial
purchase next arose in the Eighth Circuit. In Emerson Electric
Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., Emerson initially acquired more
than 10 percent of the outstanding stock of Dodge Manufactur-
ing Corporation and shortly thereafter Dodge merged into Reli-
ance. Within six months of its purchase, Emerson sold all of
the stock in two steps-the first reduced its holding to just
under 10 percent and the second disposed of the remainder.2
The court adopted the Stella construction of the phrase "at the
time of": "simultaneously with" the purchase and "prior to"
the sale. 3 The concern of the Emerson court was that any other
view would weaken the application of the statute in contraven-
tion of the congressional purpose. The court pointed out that
with an initial purchase of a large block of stock, followed by a
sale within six months, the stockholder within that period
could obtain much inside information and also could influence,
manipulate or control corporate transactions. 4 For, as was said
by the court in Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.,"5 "[tihe pre-
sumed access to such information resulting from this purchase
provides him with an opportunity, not available to the invest-
ing public, to sell his shares at the moment most advantageous
92. 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970). Emerson Electric Co. purchased 13.2 percent
of the outstanding common stock of Dodge Manufacturing Co. pursuant to a tender
offer made in an unsuccessful attempt to take over Dodge. Shortly thereafter, the
shareholders of Dodge approved a merger with Reliance Electric Co. Rather than be
forced to exchange its Dodge shares for stock in the merged corporation, Emerson
decided to sell part of its stock in Dodge, thereby bringing its holdings to just below
10 percent-9.96 percent. See Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 354 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970), where the exchange of shares of one corporation
for those of another pursuant to a merger agreement was held to constitute a sale
within the meaning of section 16(b). Emerson subsequently disposed of the remainder
of its holdings of Dodge stock, 9.96 percent, within six months of its initial purchase.
Both sales resulted in profits to Emerson, which profits Reliance claimed belonged to
it under section 16(b)'s forfeiture requirement.
93. Id. at 923-24.
94. Id. at 924. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934). See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1060
passim (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1953); Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1 (1934).
95. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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to him."" The court in Emerson then noted that the deterrence
of such apparent potential mischief must have been within the
contemplation of Congress, and concluded that unless the
phrase "at the time of" meant "simultaneously with" the pur-
chase, such potentially abusive transactions could not effec-
tively be discouraged."
Thus, by way of an "objective" analysis of the purpose of
section 16(b), the court held that the purchase by which a
security holder acquired more than 10 percent status was in-
tended to be included as part of the "pair" constituting the
purchase/sale transaction under section 16(b). The court addi-
tionally held that the second part of the two-step sale by Emer-
son was exempt under the section, reasoning that "at the time
of" that sale, Emerson was not a more than 10 percent benefi-
cial owner, and had no section 16(b) access to inside informa-
tion."
The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted Reli-
ance's petition for certiorari and had before it only the issue of
whether the second part of a two-part sale was to be included
in calculating the short swing profits under section 16(b) when
"at the time of" the second sale, the owner/seller of the securi-
ties was not a more than 10 percent owner.9 Mr. Justice Stew-
art, speaking for the Court, answered this in the negative, also
adopting an "objective" approach to section 16(b). The Court
additionally based its holding on an objective reading of the
section: it was unable to infer an intent by Congress that the
objective standard of the section was to give way upon proof of
a pre-existing intent by the seller to avoid section 16(b) liabil-
ity. IS
96. 425 F.2d at 356.
97. 434 F.2d at 924. Consider also the abusive practices noted in S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934), and S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers, and Stockholders: Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 38 MICH. L. REV. 133, 139-52 (1959).
98. 434 F.2d at 926. See note 92 supra. See generally Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (dictum), quoting with approval
Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1934).
99. 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), af'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
Because Emerson did not file a cross-petition for certiorari, the Court did not have
before it the question of whether section 16(b) encompasses the purchase in a pur-
chase/sale sequence by which purchase "more than 10 percent beneficial ownership"
was obtained. See note 92 supra.
100. 404 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1972); see T. Corcoran, 1934 Hearings, supra note 7,
at 6557.
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The dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas should be noted since
he contended that the majority, on the pretext of an "objec-
tive" approach, undermined the statute.""1 Douglas reasoned
that under an "objective" approach, as taken by previous
courts,"' the primary consideration was the effectuation of the
remedial purpose of the statute and that a clearly planned two-
step sale to avoid liability could not be permitted in light of its
deterrent purpose."3 The dissent then noted that the general
"objective" approach taken by the courts was to construe the
section in the broadest terms possible, to impose liability ir-
respective of the intentions of the insider and to resolve all
doubts and ambiguities against him.'"4 The majority, Douglas
urged, construed the section literally and in a restrictive
manner incompatible with the "objective" approach taken by
previous courts.
The majority approach seems more persuasive, however,
even though Emerson's "avoidance" was calculated.' 0 The dis-
sent seemed to explore the transaction from a subjective angle,
concluding that it was a planned split-sale which was in sub-
stance a single sale, thereby falling within section 16(b). Al-
though the argument in this regard has merit, section 16(b)
does not permit such an examination into the intentions of the
owner/seller." ' Further, it should be noted that the construc-
101. 404 U.S. 418, 431 (1972).
102. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Truncale v.
Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
103. The problem with the argument in the dissent is that it is based on a clear,
hard case; that is, the intention was admitted, and the two sales were close in time.
However, to decide subjectively in this case, as the dissent urges, that the two sales
by Emerson were one, would force the Court to inquire into any situation where more
than one sale is employed to divest the trader of his holdings of more than 10 percent.
Such a task was what Congress sought to obviate. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at
6557-58. But see Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973) (adopting a subjective approach); Lowenfils, Section 16(b): A New Trend in
Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1969); Painter, The Evolving Role
of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. REV. 649 (1964).
104. See note 85 supra.
105. 404 U.S. 418, 431-34 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
106. See notes 92 & 103 supra.
107. See note 4 supra. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557 (emphasis
added), where Mr. T. Corcoran expressly stated that the implementation of the forfei-
ture of profits requirement of section 16(b) was to be effected "irrespective of any
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tion adopted by the majority with regard to the second sale was
that adopted and urged by previous courts and commentators
applying an "objective" approach.
The question of whether section 16(b) reaches the pur-
chase by which the trader acquires more than 10 percent own-
ership, not before the Court in Reliance,'5 remained unre-
solved, although there were intimations in the Court's decision
that the purchase was encompassed by section 16(b). First, the
Court quoted with apparent approval the interpretations of
section 16(b) of Mr. E. Seligman and Prof. L. Loss.'0 9 Since
both Seligman and Loss have construed the section as applica-
ble to the initial transaction-that is, the purchase by which
one becomes a more than 10 percent beneficial owner followed
by a sale within a period of less than six months-and since the
quoted portions seized upon by the Court were taken from
passages which urged a "simultaneously with" construction, 10
it seemed that had the issue been before the Court, it might
have so held.
Another factor that suggested such a construction was the
Court's repeated emphasis on the language "at the time of...
sale" in regard to the split-sale technique employed by Emer-
son. Again, the opinion seemed implicitly to suggest that sec-
tion 16(b) would have been applicable had Emerson made a
single sale, since "at the time of. . .sale" it would have been
a more than 10 percent owner. For Emerson to have been
liable on a single sale, the section 16(b) transaction would have
had to include the initial purchase as part of the "pair."
Moreover, the construction including the purchase by
which one becomes a more than 10 percent owner within the
purview of section 16(b) is part and parcel of the "objective"
approach, so it seems consistent to infer its tacit acceptance by
the majority, particularly since the cases which the Court re-
ferred to in support of its position each construed the section
in the broadest terms possible."'
intentions or expectations" of the insider trader. It is clear, then, that to scrutinize the
motives of the trader to determine whether he should fall within section 16(b) is
contrary to the section's intended application.
108. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
109. Id. at 423 & n.3.
110. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 passim (2d ed. 1961); Seligman,
Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1934).
111. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1970); Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Adler
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Kern County v. Occidental Petroleum-The Speculative
Abuse Test
The Court next had an opportunity to resolve the issue of
whether the purchase by which the purchaser became a more
than 10 percent owner was within the reach of section 16(b) in
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp."' Occi-
dental, through a series of tender offers to the shareholders of
Kern, attempted to acquire control. Its take-over attempt,
however, fell short because Kern "defensively" merged with
Tenneco Corporation; concommittant with that merger, the
outstanding shares of old Kern were to be exchanged for shares
of new Kern. Occidental viewed its resulting minority position
in new Kern as unacceptable and thus executed an option
agreement for the sale of its holdings, which agreement was the
basis of Kern's section 16(b) claim. The Court however, in a 6-
3 decision, again side-stepped the question,"3 this time by tak-
ing a "pragmatic" approach to section 16(b). Mr. Justice
White, for the majority of the Court, inquired whether the
transaction carried with it a potential for speculative
abuse-hence the "speculative abuse test.""' The Court then
examined Occidental's transaction in light of the surrounding
v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
112. 411 U.S. 582 (1973), aff'g 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971). After unsuccessfully
seeking to merge with Kern County Land Co. (Old Kern), Occidental made a tender
offer to purchase 500,000 shares of Old Kern common stock. It was a total success, so
Occidental extended its offer for an additional 500,000 shares. At the close of the tender
offer Occidental owned 887,549 shares of Old Kern or roughly 20 percent. During this
period, however, the management of Old Kern undertook measures to frustrate
Occidental's take-over attempt, by negotiating a merger with Tenneco to form New
Kern. Realizing that if the merger were approved it would have to exchange its shares
of Old Kern for New Kern and would be "locked" into a minority position, Occidental
entered into an option agreement whereby it granted the rights to purchase the stock
it would receive on the merger. The option was not to be exercisable for six months
and one day after the close of Occidental's tender offer. It was executed, however,
within six months of that date. The merger was effected and Occidental's option (to
sell) was exercised more than six months from the date of its execution. Occidental
realized substantial profits therefrom, upon which New Kern brought suit under sec-
tion 16(b)'s forfeiture requirement. The district court granted summary judgment
holding that the execution of the option agreement was a sale within section 16(b).
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither the option nor the exchange
constituted a sale within the meaning of section 16(b). Abrams v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
113. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 421 (1972).
114. See 411 U.S. 582, 597 (1973).
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circumstances and found that as the target of an unsuccessful
take-over attempt, Occidental's transaction was "involuntary"
and "unorthodox" and presented no possibility for specula-
tion." '1 In essence, the Court interpreted the sale of securities
by Occidental as not constituting a sale within the meaning of
section 16(b). The approach taken by the Court only begs the
question of whether Congress contemplated such a transaction
within section 16(b). In light of the admittedly scant legislative
history of the section, it must be assumed that Congress did
intend for section 16(b) to reach such a transaction."'
Faced with frequent abusive and "vicious" predatory prac-
tices, Congress adopted a flat rule to take the profits out of a
class of transactions irrespective of the intentions, expecta-
tions, or other facts and circumstances, "7 and despite the reali-
zation that such a crude rule of thumb would create hardships
in certain cases. As Thomas Corcoran stated, "You have to
have a general rule. In particular transactions it might work a
hardship, but those transactions that are a hardship represent
the sacrifice to the necessity to having a general rule.""'
The Court's conclusion in Occidental that the terms "pur-
chase" and "sale,""' 9 as used in section 16(b), mean only "vol-
115. Id. The Court's conclusion seems inconsistent with section 16(b), which was
designed to prevent any unfair use of information by taking the profits out of that class
of transactions where there was a possiblity that inside information was used; the bite
of the rule was intended to be sharp, limited only by its arbitrary standards. See Gratz
v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). It seems wholly
without logic and inconsistent with section 16(b) to state on the one hand that there
was no possibility for speculative abuse through unfair use of inside information in
Occidental's transaction, and on the other that "Old Kern voluntarily permitted
inspection of Old Kern's general ledger, consolidated financial statements, consoli-
dated journal entries, details of cash receipts from oil operations, supporting trial
balances and other records." Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
411 U.S. 582, 587 & n.12, 600. (1973). The information to which Occidental had access
is the kind most useful to the insider speculating on the short swing. See generally S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
55-68 (1934). It is only too clear that section 16(b) was intended to prevent the realiza-
tion of profits under such circumstances. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d
Cir. 1949). Therefore, the finding of the Court that there was no possibility for specula-
tive abuse and that Occidental's sale was not a section 16(b) sale is without basis,
inconsistent with congressional legislation, and must realistically be viewed as little
more than a sympathetic reaction to the loser in a defensive merger. See also Cook &
Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 612,
626 (1953).
116. See notes 2, 7, 8, 11, 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
117. See 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557-58. See generally S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
118. 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6558.
119. See note 39 supra.
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untary" and "orthodox" transactions is arguably a miscon-
struction of the legislative history behind section 16(b).
The subjective "facts and circumstances" approach which
the Court in Kern County took is precisely the one that Con-
gress intended to avoid. Its intent was to adopt a rule that
would operate mechanically without a subjective exploration
into the transaction in each case."20 Further, testimony from the
hearings on the section seemed to imply that Congress in-
tended the rule to apply even where the transaction showed
signs of "involuntariness" because of unplanned or adverse
events. 2'
Thus, by excluding Occidental's sale because of its "invol-
untary" nature, the Court clearly seemed to be fashioning its
own test rather than using the one intended by Congress. It is
true that the objective approach intended by Congress may
indeed work hardships in certain cases, but as noted earlier,
they must be accepted as the sacrifice to a successful remedy. 22
Even discounting legislative history, the Court's determi-
nation that an "involuntary" and "unorthodox" transaction
120. The court in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,320 U.S. 751 (1943), remarked on the "mechanical" nature of section 16(b) by stating
that any other interpretation requiring a subjective standard
would render senseless the provisions of the legislation, limiting the lia-
bility period to six months, making the intentions immaterial .. .and
its total effect would be to render the statute little more of an incentive
to insiders to refrain from profiteering at the expense of the outside share-
holder than are the common law rules of liability.
136 F.2d at 236. See also Note, Insider Liabilityfor Short Swing Profits: The Substance
and Function of the Pragmatic Approach Once Insider Status is Determined, 72 MIcH.
L. REv. 592 (1974).
121. 1934 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6557 (emphasis added):
Senator Gore. You infer the intent from the fact.
Mr. Corcoran. From the fact.
Senator Kean. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he had
to sell?
Senator Barkley. All he would get would be what he put into it. He
would get his original investment.
Mr. Corcoran. He would get his money out, but the profit goes to
the corporation.
Senator Kean. Suppose he had to sell?
Mr. Corcoran. Let him get out what he put in, but give the corpora-
tion the profit.
122. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
One court perhaps best summed this up when it stated with regard to section
16(b), "[Wle cannot have one rule for insiders with good intentions and another for
those who would flagrantly abuse their trust." Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
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does not constitute a "sale" within section 16(b) is tenuous at
best. First, by its own terms the section subsumes all purchases
and sales. 2 ' Second, Congress broadly defined those terms to
prevent the very type of interpretation which the Court sug-
gested. For example, section 3(13) declares that a sale is any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of securities. Only sympa-
thy for Occidental's plight can explain the Court's choosing to
interpret Occidental's option contract with Tenneco Corpora-
tion as not within the section 3(13) definition of "sale."
Further, by construing section 16(b) the way it did, the
Court chose a route that not only appeared inconsistent with
its approach in Reliance, but also in direct contravention of the
statute's remedial purpose; rather than construing the statute
in the broadest terms possible, the Court construed the
exemptive provision broadly, thereby narrowing the scope of
the statute.'
Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Securities-The "Prior to"
Interpretation
The Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of whether
section 16(b) encompasses a transaction which includes the
purchase by which the purchaser becomes a more than 10 per-
cent beneficial owner in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co. In its attempt to liquidate and dissolve, Provi-
dent sold its assets to Foremost in exchange for convertible
debentures which made it a more than 10 percent owner of
Foremost equity securities; it then executed a sale within a
period of less than six months, upon which Foremost based its
section 16(b) claim. 2" This time there was no evidence of an
123. The section refers to any purchase and sale within any period of less than
six months, irrespective of any intention or expectation of the owner/trader. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1970). See note 4 supra.
124. The Court's approach to the exemptive provision in section 16(b) seems
wholly inconsistent with its previous policy, which was to construe statutory exemp-
tions to remedial legislation strictly. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 125-26 (1953); McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266 (1938); Spokane &
Inland Empire R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350 (1915); SEC v. Custer
Chanel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); SEC
v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
125. 423 U.S. 232 (1976), af'g 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974). Provident Securities
was a personal holding company which in 1968 tentatively decided to liquidate and
dissolve. Foremost-McKesson emerged as a potential purchaser and eventually pur-
chased Provident's assets. On October 15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident $4.25
million in cash and $40 million of debentures subsequently exchanged for two deben-
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"involuntary" and "unorthodox" transaction to support an
analysis similar to the one the Court used in Kern. 2 The Court
declared that by virtue of the exemptive provision, a beneficial
owner is accountable under section 16(b) in a purchase/sale
transaction only if he was an owner-a more than 10 percent
beneficial owner-"prior to" the purchase.' 7 In reaching its
decision, the Court reviewed the legislative history and con-
cluded that Congress intended a literal reading of the exemp-
tive provision's key phrase, "at the time of." Such a construc-
tion by the Court, however, defeats the section's remedial pur-
pose and deterrent effect for many of the reasons discussed
previously.'2
In addition to reversing nearly forty years of precedent, the
Court has now "opened the floodgates" to the "sure-thing"
speculative transaction.'29 The Court has, by taking a literal
meaning of the operative words "at the time of," focused upon
tures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. On October 20, Foremost
delivered an addititional $7.25 million of debentures, which was the balance. All of the
debentures were immediately convertible into more than 10 percent of Foremost com-
mon stock. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), (11) (1970) in which convertible debentures are
defined as equity securities, and as such they fall within section 16(b). Provident was
thus a more than 10 percent beneficial owner of Foremost securities within the meaning
of section 16(b). On October 21 Provident executed an underwriting agreement which
was to be closed on October 28 and which provided for the sale by Provident of $25
million in debentures. Provident thereafter distributed to its shareholders the
remaining debentures and the proceeds from the sale to the underwriters. Foremost
brought suit under section 16(b) to recover profits realized by Provident by its sale of
the debentures.
It should be noted that the district court in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Sec. Co., 331 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1971) and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), held
that the sale took place at the time of the signing of the underwriting agreement on
October 21 and not when the deal was closed on October 28. The significance of this
is that between the time that the underwriting agreement was signed and the time
that it was closed, Provident had distributed sufficient debentures to its shareholders
to reduce its holdings of Foremost securities to less than 10 percent; presumably, if
the sale had occurred at the closing rather than at the signing, at least in the view of
the courts, there would have been no section 16(b) liability. The United States Su-
preme Court did not consider this issue, since it found that the transaction by Provi-
dent was not within the purview of section 16(b). See 423 U.S. at 238 n.6 (1976).
126. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 506 F.2d 601, 604-05(9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232, 239 n.8 (1976); cf. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1072 (2d ed. 1961).
127. 423 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1976). It should be noted that the decision of the
Court was not limited to the facts of this case, but rather was an intepretation of
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
128. See notes 13-23, 27-33 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
129. See, e.g., notes 2 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
SHORT SWING SPECULATION
the "ripening of equity ownership," rather than more appropri-
ately upon the salutary nature of the statute and the evils
which Congress sought to curb. 3"
First, the Court found the approach urged by Foremost,
and also by this Comment, unsatisfactory because of its seem-
ing emphasis on those potential abusive situations outside the
reach of section 16(b). The Court rather opted for a narrow
interpretation of the section itself, and construed the exemp-
tive provision expansively.13" '
Second, the Court inferred from the evolution of section
16(b), from its initial proposal through its passage,'32 that only
"more than 10 percent beneficial owners" who held that status
"prior to" their purchase/sale transaction were intended to fall
within the scope of the section.133
These conclusions are at least unfortunate, and arguably
they are wrong. Lacking any express elucidation of Congress'
intent, the legislative history is vague as to the exact meaning
to be afforded the words "at the time of"; however, the intent
that they be construed broadly to limit the applicability of the
exemption is implicit in the expressed goal of the section. '
Although the Court quoted extensively from the history of the
section, it failed to give way to what should have determined
its construction of the section: the congressional policy under-
lying the section."' The Court seemed to construe the language
of the exemption literally instead of examining the provision's
substantive effect on the entire section-a process which would
have led to the conclusion that the exemptive provision was
added for the purpose of insuring the section's remedial effect,
130. See notes 48-55 and accompanying text supra.
131. 423 U.S. 232, 243-44 (1976).
132. See S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934) (the initial Bill), amended
and modified, H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934), modified and enacted,
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1946). See also note 136 infra for the relevant text of S. 2693 and
H.R. 8720; note 4 supra for the relevant text of 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
133. 423 U.S. 232, 245-46 (1976).
134. See, e.g., Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court, citing Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949)
and Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), remarked:
Although the legislative history of section 16(b) fails to afford a clue
as to the precise meaning of the words at the time of, the congressional
purpose underlying the enactment of this section is clear. It was "to
protect the outside stockholders against at least short swing speculation
by insiders with advance information."
(Emphasis added.)
135. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
19761
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
and that the changes effected during the evolution of the bills(such as excising the words "owning as of record") were made
for the purposes of eliminating the limiting and restrictive lan-
guage of the early drafts. 3 ' The Court, however, expanded the
exemption's applicability in a manner inconsistent with the
basic purpose of the section and consequently undermined its
deterrent effect. In short, by construing the exemptive provi-
sion to mean "prior to," the Court has all but removed the
"teeth" of section 16(b).
The Court further justified its interpretation of the exemp-
tive provision by construing the 10 percent ownership require-
ment which applies only to persons not directors or officers, as
evidence of congressional intent not to impose liability on thebasis of a purchase when, "prior to" that purchase, the trader
was not an insider. 3 That reasoning is flawed, however, for it
focuses narrowly and inappropriately on the purchase itself,
rather than on the transaction as a whole. The question which
136. Compare S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934) (emphasis added) withH.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934). S. 2693 would have provided in relevant
part:
It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any
class of stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a na-
tional securities exchange-
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention or
expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any profit
made by such person on any transaction in such a registered security
extending over a period of less than six months shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding the security pur-
chased for a period exceeding six months.
H.R. 8720 would have provided in relevant part:
Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, director, or officer from
any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of any such registered equity
security within a period of less than six months, unless such security was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any inten-
tion on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repur-
chasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . ...
See also note 4 supra for the text of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). It should be noted that other than the change in the minimal
ownership requisite for presumed insider status for mere stockholders from 5 percent
in H.R. 8720 to 10 percent in section 16(b), H.R. 8720 is substantively similar to section
16(b).
137. See 423 U.S. 232, 253-54 (1976).
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shoidld be asked is whether the transaction carries with it the
dangers and abusive potential which Congress considered in-
tolerable,'38 not whether the purchase (or sale) by itself poses
such dangers. Only this approach is adequate to insure that
those situations in which there is an opportunity for abuse in
the event of a sale after "insider" status is achieved will fall,
as they properly should, within the scope of section 16(b).' 31
CONCLUSION
It seems apparent, in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Kern County'40 and Foremost-McKesson,"I that if at
all possible, section 16(b) will now be construed in favor of the
"insider" trader. Once a crude rule of thumb designed to de-
ter any potentially abusive short swing transaction, section
16(b) is now becoming little more than a figurehead in securi-
ties regulation. It was indeed intended to be draconian, as indi-
cated by its own terms which subsume all transactions ir-
respective of whether there was an intent to speculate, or
whether there was in fact any actual misuse of inside informa-
tion. Such an arbitrary rule was adopted because it was be-
lieved to be the only effective remedy to prevent the "vicious"
practices which were frequent among corporate fiduciaries.
The Court however, has now construed section 16(b) in a man-
ner that would allow several of those abusive practices'42 to
remain unchecked; as a result, it is unlikely that the fiduciary
today would hesitate to trade on advance information.'43 The
Court, by removing the "teeth" from section 16(b), has in effect
made this possible. Perhaps the growing trend toward using
Rule 10b-51" in any securities action explains the Court's con-
138. See, e.g., notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
139. See, e.g., note 58 and accompanying text supra.
140. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
141. 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
142. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
143. Indeed, in a survey of "reputable" businessmen, 42% of those
responding indicated they would themselves trade on inside information,
and 61% believed that the "average" executive would do likewise.
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 435 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissent-
ing), relying on Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REv. 6,
16 (1961).
144. Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
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struction of section 16(b). But section 16(b) has advantages
that rule 10b-5 does not: it was intended to operate mechani-
cally to obviate the burden of proof for the plaintiff. Rule 10b-
5, on the other hand, is, in its modern application, virtually
limitless in its jurisdictional reach; but it is not self-operative
and its applicability depends on proof of intent or injury to the
plaintiff'"-elements which Congress made irrelevant under
section 16(b). Moreover, section 16(b)'s scope is not to be af-
fected by alternative sanctions, such as those in rule 10b-5,
which might also inhibit abuse of inside information.
As a result, knowing that the Supreme Court is inclined
toward a restrictive interpretation of section 16(b), "insiders"
will not be wholly discouraged from unfairly speculating on a
short swing. The Court has, in effect, chained the watch-dog
to the back door.
Michael D. Weiner
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or article to defraud,(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
145. Application of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, is, under its current construc-
tion, far from automatic. First, a private damages action under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 is confined to actual purchasers or sellers of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Second, in order to recover, the plaintiff must
show that defendant's activities involved scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976).
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